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I. INTRODUCTION
The lure of doing empirical research in legal scholarship is strong,
but the appeal of critiquing judicial selection is stronger. So it is
rather surprising that empirical analysis figures very little in the voluminous legal commentary on judicial selection. Instead, legal
scholars devote little attention to the actual numbers in judicial selection; they generally defer to, or merely accept, the empirical work
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James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, Princeton University,
Spring 2004. I am grateful to Scott Baker and Mitu Gulati for helpful comments on an earlier draft. My contribution to this Symposium is an expanded version of my essay entitled
Merit vs. Ideology, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 353 (2005).
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done by others, particularly social scientists, on judicial selection.
While some of these studies are excellent,1 many have problems. In
this Essay, I explore three basic challenges to doing empirical studies
of judicial selection and suggest ways to meet these challenges. My
hope is to give some useful guidance to legal scholars and others interested in developing a more sophisticated understanding of the judicial selection process through empirical analysis.
The first challenge, discussed in Part II, is defining merit. Many
legal scholars rarely discuss merit in their commentaries on judicial
selection, even though developing a coherent notion of merit is essential for evaluating the quality of judicial nominations. Consequently,
in Part II, I examine the empirical challenges posed by several plausible definitions of merit. This discussion should help to illuminate,
inter alia, the importance of merit as a normative criterion for judicial selection as well as the significant relationship between merit
and the one thing almost all commentators assume is a principal
driving force in judicial selection: Ideology, by which I mean precommitments to certain outcomes or approaches for analyzing constitutional issues, regardless of the facts of particular cases.
In Part III, I examine the benefits of avoiding the popular practice
of labeling judicial nominees on the bases of their supposed ideologies. Politicians and social scientists share a strong proclivity to pigeonhole judges and Justices based on their supposed ideologies, but
their labels tend to be overly simplistic, inaccurate, incomplete, misleading, and value-laden. They tend to obscure, if not ignore, the subtle differences in judicial philosophies as well as the basic fact that
some Justices and judges do not have fixed ideologies either at the
time of their initial appointments or perhaps ever. Moreover, because
of ideological drift (and other factors), the categories scholars and
others use in analyzing judicial performance are not static. Perhaps
the most serious problem with labeling is that it obscures the middle,
or the mainstream, in American constitutional jurisprudence. Politicians fight to place their nominations within the mainstream for a
reason: It provides a benchmark against which to measure politicians’ and others’ characterizations of judicial performance. Each
side strives to include its nominees within the mainstream and to
push the other side’s outside of it. Moreover, each side has a strong
incentive to push the envelope in confirmation proceedings, because
it will help expand the safe ground available to its nominees but

1. See, e.g., SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997); Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of
Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003).
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situate the other side’s nominees closer to, if not beyond, the outside
of the mainstream.
In Part IV, I explore possible empirical tests for determining the
relative impacts of almost a dozen factors on the fates of judicial
nominations. These recommendations will help legal scholars (and
others) move beyond their unfounded assumptions about the forces
driving federal judicial selection and be more precise with the terms
they employ for characterizing judicial qualifications or performance.
While it may never be possible to bridge the divide among national
political leaders on such basic things as defining merit or ideology in
judicial selection, empirical research at least holds the promise of illuminating common ground for those outside the process to evaluate
what happens inside of it.
II. MERIT
In this Part, I examine a basic question that presumably is of
great interest to everyone concerned with the quality of judging: How
do we measure fitness for office and, particularly, how do we determine who are the best qualified people for appointment to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the U.S. courts of appeals, and U.S. district courts?
There are several possible definitions of merit, each of which poses a
challenge for empirical analysis of judicial selection. I discuss several
possible definitions of merit and the respective empirical challenges
posed by each of them.
A. The Conventional, Elitist Definition of Merit
One way to define merit is simply to examine how it has been defined in the past. A review of the critical literature on merit indicates
that, as a descriptive matter, critical elites have always defined merit
to suit their own purposes.2 Different sectors and professions develop
their own, self-serving conceptions of merit. With respect to judicial
appointments, there has never been some objective, or neutral, criterion of merit. Instead, the governing elite has made judicial appointments to further its own interests. Consequently, merit is defined so as to allow for, if not to maximize, the appointments of relatives, friends, and especially political allies.3 For any given presidency or era, the essential tasks are to figure out the conception of
merit advanced by the governing elite and how well nominees fit this
2. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003)
(noting that President Reagan employed a conception of merit based in large part on adherence to the doctrine of original understanding).
3. Cf. KERMIT L. HALL, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE (1979) (describing the use of patronage in federal court appointments between the years 1829-1861).
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particular conception. It has been quite common for Presidents to
choose judicial nominees who not only share their constitutional vision but are also likely to be supportive of their administrations’ policies. For instance, President George Washington chose his judicial
nominations based in part on their support for the ratification of the
Constitution and commitment to Federalist ideals,4 while President
Lincoln opted for judicial nominees who supported the Union and Reconstruction.5
There are, however, three major problems with relying on an instrumental conception of merit as an empirical measure of the quality of judicial nominations. First, the conception is unstable. It
changes at least as often as the governing elite does. For instance,
President Reagan, from 1980 through 1986, employed a conception of
merit that included rigid commitment to original understanding.6
Once Democrats took control of the Senate in 1986, the pressure
mounted on President Reagan to moderate his definition. He soon
did: After his first two nominations to replace then-retiring Justice
Powell failed, President Reagan modified his conception of merit to
settle on someone with more moderate views, Anthony Kennedy.
President George H.W. Bush might have been disposed to employ the
same definition of merit adopted originally by President Reagan. But
facing a Democrat-controlled Senate, with a majority hostile to rigid
commitments to original understanding, President Bush chose a
candidate without a paper trail on ideology—David Souter—to replace then-retiring Justice Brennan.
Second, it is a mistake to assume the governing elite is candid
about its conception of merit. In some cases, governing elites are not
forthcoming—and some might go so far as to suggest they are deceptive—about their conception of merit. President George W. Bush insists that merit is his principal selection criterion, but he has never
given a detailed definition of his conception of merit. Nor does merit,
however defined, seem to explain all his judicial nominations. For instance, President Bush twice nominated and eventually made a recess appointment of Charles Pickering, Sr., to a seat on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, though Pickering was the most
reversed district judge in his circuit. It is hard to explain Pickering’s
appointment as based on some objective criterion of merit.
Third, the governing elite’s definition of merit works very poorly
as a normative criterion. Using each administration’s definition of
merit to evaluate its nominees allows it, not any external or inde4. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 53-60 (new & rev. ed.
1999).
5. See id. at 86-92.
6. See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 2.
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pendent source, to define the terms on which they may be measured.
Each administration’s definition of merit is likely to be self-serving,
so in all likelihood it would be a rare case—perhaps like Pickering’s
nomination—that does not fit within its definition of merit. The less
precise an administration is in defining merit, the easier it will be to
show that its nominees satisfy it. Thus, it is conceivable that even
Pickering can be defended as a merit appointment on some grounds,
such as his longstanding experience as a district court judge and the
respect that he has earned from the lawyers appearing before him as
well as the members of local and state bar associations. Yet, the less
precise an elite’s definition of merit, the less useful it becomes as a
normative criterion, because it is not stringent enough to rule anything out. Moreover, it would be extremely unfair to use one governing elite’s definition to measure the quality of an appointment made
by a different governing elite, because they will have been likely defined in opposition to each other. President Reagan’s definition of
merit, for instance, was deliberately designed to contrast with the
appointments of his Democratic predecessors as well as the politically moderate Gerald Ford. He chose his definition in part because it
ruled out the likelihood of choosing people like those nominated to
judgeships by Ford or Presidents Johnson and Carter.
Thus, the elite’s definitions of merit are of limited relevance to
empirical research. To be sure, they may be useful for clarifying a
particular administration’s expectations of its nominees. But elitist
definitions of merit are unlikely to be useful in satisfying more ambitious empirical objectives. Empirical research requires developing
criteria with more explanatory potential and normative value.
B. The Public as Arbiter of Merit: Social Scientists Do Not Have a
Uniform Conception of Merit
Some agree that merit is a purely instrumental concept. Perhaps
the most aggressive advocates of this conception are Harold Spaeth
and Jeffrey Segal. They argue that judicial selection is not based on
any neutral conception of merit. Instead, they claim, Supreme Court
Justices reflect the values, or preferences, of the governing elite.7
They are chosen, in other words, because they are likely to uphold
the values and preferences of the people who appoint them. Understanding judicial selection in this manner helps explain why Supreme Court Justices never stray far from standing behind the policies or cultural beliefs of the people who appointed them. Instead,
Segal and Spaeth argue, Justices are picked on the basis of their
7. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86-97 (2002) (describing judges as motivated in their decisionmaking primarily by personal policy preferences).
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likely ideologies with respect to social policy. Once on the bench, they
merely vote their policy preferences.
Many other social scientists take contrary viewpoints on merit.
They believe that in empirical research it is important to ground a
conception of merit in a source independent from, or external to, the
actual judicial selection process. An external definition of merit is
useful normatively, because it provides an arguably neutral benchmark detached from an actual Justice’s selection against which to
measure his or her qualifications and performance. For instance, social scientists sometimes use the public as an external source for defining merit. This definition allows researchers to measure judicial
selection against public opinion.
In this Symposium, Lee Epstein and her coauthors suggest a
variation on this approach. They suggest the media as one possible
evaluator of merit.8 They consider merit as simply being whatever
the media has defined it to be. This is, however, a problematic measure for several reasons. First, it is unclear why the media should be
regarded as neutral on this matter. Indeed, many thoughtful people
believe that the media is not neutral. They believe that the media
has its own ideological agenda, which is likely to influence its coverage of events and its evaluations of the merits of judicial nominees.
For instance, it is hard to imagine that The Wall Street Journal editorial page or the Fox News Network will seriously question President Bush’s declarations about the merits of his judicial nominees.
Second, the media has no apparent interest in being or becoming a
neutral arbiter of merit. There is no good reason to believe that the
media has the public interest at heart and thus can be fairly or sensibly viewed as acting on its behalf. By all accounts, the media loves
to cover scandal and conflict. The need for the media to make money,
coupled with intense competition arising from the twenty-four-hour
news cycle and the Internet, has exacerbated the declining interest
in simply reporting the hard news—that is, facts and figures.9 The
media increasingly prefers to report soft news—that is, speculation
and commentary.10 Drama is likely to attract reader or viewer interest, and so the media increasingly reports as much drama as it can.
A neutral assessment of merit, if it were to be made at all, is likely to
be lost in the avalanche of soft news that dominates media reporting.
Moreover, many commentators are not lawyers, and many of the
8. Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to
the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145 (2005).
9. See Stephen Hess, Media to Government: Drop Dead, BROOKINGS REV., Winter
2000, at 28 (suggesting that news coverage of and public interest in politics has declined).
10. See, e.g., MARVIN L. KALB, ONE SCANDALOUS STORY: CLINTON, LEWINSKY, AND
THIRTEEN DAYS THAT TARNISHED AMERICAN JOURNALISM (2001); BILL KORACH & TOM
ROSENTIEL, WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF MIXED MEDIA (1999).
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ones who are lawyers are unlikely to be neutral—they are likely to be
fierce combatants for one extreme viewpoint on a nomination.
Third, the media lacks any expertise in evaluating merit. It is unclear why it should be supposed that the media generally has any
special insight into the qualifications for judicial service. Some commentators have law degrees and may have practiced law or served in
government; however, most are not trained as lawyers. Moreover,
many professions evaluate merit based on the assessments of those
within the profession. Some quickly write this off as merely a custom
or price of admission into a particular guild. While it may be true
that professionals are not necessarily the only ones who can evaluate
what they do professionally, it does not follow that professionals are
ill equipped to evaluate each other’s professional performance. Thus,
yet another important empirical study to undertake is measuring the
extent to which a particular profession, such as legal practitioners or
judges, is well equipped to evaluate its own practitioners.11
C. Assumptions on Which Most People Agree
One possible reason legal scholars do not discuss merit is because
most of us—indeed, perhaps most people—share a number of assumptions about merit in judicial selection. It is possible that with
respect to merit we might have more consensus than generally acknowledged. Thus, it is important to consider the assumptions about
merit on which there may be substantial if not uniform agreement.
Below, I consider two different ways for illuminating such assumptions and the problems with empirically demonstrating each, particularly separating merit from ideology.
1. Imagining the Ideal Judicial Nominee
Imagine, for a moment, that you have been asked by the President
to draft a list of qualifications for nominees to the Supreme Court
and to other Article III courts. Imagine further that you do not know
which particular President has made this request. You are, in other
words, behind a Rawlsean veil of ignorance,12 for you do not know
anything particular about whether this will ultimately help or hurt
you, what kinds of cases will likely come before the courts, the President’s party, and the composition of the Senate. Is it possible to draft
such a list, and if so, what qualities would be on the list? Below, I
consider five possible qualities that could conceivably satisfy our collective assumptions about merit.

11. Cf. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299
(2004).
12. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 24 (rev. ed. 1999).
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(a) Professional Experience and Accomplishments
It is easy to see the importance of meaningful, first-hand professional experience to judicial selection. We want our judges and Justices to be familiar with the business and responsibilities of the
courts to which they have been nominated. We do not want appointees to need on-the-job training. The ideal is someone whose experience specially qualifies her or him for judicial appointment.
The requisite experience might not be the same for every Article
III court. Presumably, the ideal experience for a Supreme Court Justice is practicing before the Court and perhaps serving in other offices, such as lower court judgeships, that employ similar (but not
identical) skills. Meaningful experience might also include serving in
a significant public office, for it might enrich the nominee’s understanding of the system from which the laws appealed to her Court
will come. Rich professional experience is bound to sharpen nominees’ judgments and provide a solid foundation from which to approach the significant legal questions that come routinely before the
Supreme Court.
The ideal experience for a federal court of appeals judge is substantial appellate practice or prior service as a judge on a comparable
court or perhaps on a federal trial court. Meaningful experience
might also include demonstrated or proven expertise in some areas of
the law. The ideal may be that the leading practitioners or scholars
in different fields would bring their respective expertise (and the
skills that allowed them to develop it) to the task of judging.
The ideal experience for a district judge is substantial trial experience. Not all trial lawyers will make good district judges, but all
good district judges presumably understand how to manage trials of
all shapes and sizes and large caseloads. The ideal experience may
also include service as a judge on a comparable court, such as a state
supreme court.
Demonstrating empirically the extent to which judicial nominees
have, or deviate from, ideal experience should not be difficult. We already have considerable data on the professional backgrounds of the
people nominated to judgeships. For instance, we have the rates of
affirmance and reversal for sitting judges. We can also count years
devoted to legal practice and determine the relative weight to be assigned to the professional work nominees did prior to their nominations. Judicial nominees’ professional experience need not have been
in the public sector, but the more firsthand experience with the legal
system a nominee has, the better. We could assign more weight to
public service experience, but we need not discount entirely other
professional experience. Furthermore, we could measure familiarity
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with the legal system based on the data gathered by bar groups or
those who have worked closely with the nominees.
(b) Legal Acumen
We expect judicial nominees to have very high degrees of legal
acumen. We expect judicial nominees to be highly intelligent, perhaps to have performed quite well in law school, maybe even to have
attended an elite law school. At the very least, we would want to
make sure that the nominee has very sound legal skills; is capable of
asking intelligent, probing questions; thinks critically (if not imaginatively) about legal problems; identifies legal issues in a wide range
of problems; is trained at problem-solving; is diligent; and understands the special duties that she will be called upon to discharge.
Measuring this criterion entails coordinating different data. There
will be some objective data (such as the law school attended or the
number of law review articles written) and some subjective data
(such as measuring the opinions of the bar or those who have practiced before or with the nominees).
(c) Judicial Temperament
We expect judicial nominees to have excellent judicial temperament. The ideal temperament for a judge or Justice is presumably to
have the capacity to make decisions evenhandedly, to be openminded in listening to and considering the arguments in the cases
that come before him, and to be respectful to litigants and other appellate judges or Justices with differing opinions. A district judge
may largely work alone in deciding cases but still needs a great deal
of patience to sit through long trials and other legal proceedings.
Moreover, a good judicial temperament requires, of course, a disposition to follow the law. Judicial nominees need, in other words, to
demonstrate in some ways that they are well suited to resolving legal
disputes rather than rewriting the laws they are interpreting. Judicial nominees also need to be able to handle the intense pressures
that come with the responsibilities of being judges or Justices.
Collegiality is a related measure of ideal judicial qualifications.13
Collegiality requires getting along with the other Justices or judges
with whom one must work. Collegiality also entails being able to
build coalitions and to maintain cordial relations with other judges or
Justices, regardless of the extent to which one may agree or disagree
with their views in particular cases. Maintaining cordial relations is

13. On the importance of collegiality, see Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality
on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003); and Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998).
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no mean feat on the Supreme Court, which Justice Holmes once described as “nine scorpions in a bottle.”14 Not all people who must
work together in relatively close quarters successfully maintain respect and civility over long periods of time, but the ideal nominee
must have this capability.
Empirically demonstrating excellent judicial temperament or collegiality is not easy. To be sure, if nominees have had lots of verified
complaints filed against them for temperamental outbursts, those
would be signs of problems with temperament. If the complaints
come from other judges, they undoubtedly will call into question a
nominee’s collegiality. Moreover, taking temperament or collegiality
into account invites unsubstantiated rumors or insinuations from
critics. Measuring nominees’ collegiality or temperament thus requires sorting fact from fiction. It requires, in other words, developing credibly neutral measurement.
(d) Writing Skills
Yet another criterion for the ideal nominee is excellent writing
ability. This is particularly true for Supreme Court Justices and federal appellate judges, who are called upon to draft large numbers of
opinions. The ideal Supreme Court or federal court of appeals nominee should be able to write clear, coherent opinions. It is especially
important that the ideal nominee have the ability to craft opinions
reflecting multiple viewpoints. Moreover, it is important for the
nominee to be able to compose opinions relatively quickly given the
time pressures under which judges and Justices operate.
Measuring writing ability involves both objective and subjective
data. The objective data include judges’ productivity and the amount
of time it takes for judges to produce opinions, particularly as compared to the other judges with whom they regularly sit. The extent of
a nominee’s nonjudicial writings may also be pertinent. It reflects,
inter alia, their contributions (if not their leadership) in refining our
understandings and reforms of different areas of the law. Subjective
data include the quality of a nominee’s writings and speeches. The
quality of the latter depends on the assessments of others, including,
but not limited, to peers and experts.
(e) Integrity and Character
Integrity is essential to the ideal judicial nominee. A judicial
nominee’s integrity must be beyond question in order for her or him
14. E.g., MAX LERNER, NINE SCORPIONS IN A BOTTLE: GREAT JUDGES AND CASES OF
SUPREME COURT (Richard Cummings ed., 1994); Richard A. Posner, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 13, 14 (1990) (attributing this statement to
Justice Holmes).
THE
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to exercise the fragile moral authority of a Supreme Court Justice,
federal court of appeals judge, or district judge. Judges and Justices
embody the law, and they need to comply with the very laws they expect others to follow. If nominees have not followed the laws they expect others to follow and for whose violations they may sentence
other people, they no longer can claim the special moral status on
which their job depends.
Closely related to nominees’ integrity is their moral character.
Stephen Carter and Larry Solum are just two of the many scholars
who insist that a Supreme Court Justice ought to have a strong,
moral character.15 At the very least, having a strong, moral character
means having the courage of one’s convictions and the strength not to
alter one’s opinions, or decide cases, for the sake of public or peer esteem.
Integrity and character are easier to measure in their absence
than they are positively. For instance, criminal convictions would
almost certainly disqualify someone from judicial appointment,
though it is conceivable that if the crimes were misdemeanors and
committed many years before the nominations they might be dismissed as irrelevant. Admissions or proof of wrongdoing further
demonstrate problems with integrity or character. The fact that Justice Fortas continued after his appointment to give policy advice to
President Johnson raised a question about his professional judgment.16 Even worse, his accepting money from a convicted mobster
was an ethical lapse,17 just as it is unethical for a judge or Justice to
rule on cases involving former clients or companies in which he or
she owned stock. Complaints made by spouses or children in custody
disputes might raise questions about nominees’ characters; even if no
criminal conduct were alleged, charges might be raised about the
person’s moral judgment.
In the absence of documentation, integrity and character are established through subjective data. They will be based largely on testimonials from other people. Senators tend, however, to give more
weight to negative appraisals. Because most nominees receive positive testimonials, the latter end up not receiving much attention unless they have come from people whose opinions carry great weight
with Senators. In contrast, negative testimony draws much greater

15. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 151-55 (1994); Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365 (2005).
16. For an account of these interactions, see LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS 310-18
(1990).
17. For an in-depth review of the events, see ROBERT SHOGAN, A QUESTION OF
JUDGMENT: THE FORTAS CASE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUPREME COURT (1972).
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attention. It makes headlines, provokes lots of questions, and raises
potentially fatal doubts.
(f) Other Factors
There are other qualifications that ideal nominees arguably need
to satisfy. Besides the factors already mentioned, Presidents might
also be interested in nominees’ religion, ethnicity, gender, and
health. These other factors might be important in diversifying the
composition of the federal courts or satisfying underrepresented
segments of society. Moreover, nominees’ ages have been very important to some Presidents who wanted to ensure that their appointees
could continue to serve as judges and Justices long after they left office.
(g) Empirical Complications
Of course, the criteria that are relevant for determining ideal
nominees are one thing, while the things at which Presidents or their
advisers might look in order to measure actual nominees are quite
another. The values of those charged with selecting a nominee will
inevitably influence what they choose to look at and how they will
perceive it. Moreover, it might simply be unrealistic—or reckless—to
ignore factors such as timing, the President’s party, the composition
of the Senate, the nominee’s political or party affiliation, or the compositions of individual federal courts. For instance, the composition of
the Senate might be quite pertinent to a Supreme Court nominee’s
chances of confirmation. Indeed, a President might be inclined to
choose different people, depending on whether his party controls the
Senate or whether the minority has enough members to filibuster a
contested nomination. Certain factors are bound to complicate the
nominating process. For instance, the proximity of the next presidential election cannot be ignored, since the opposing party has successfully rejected or delayed more than a few Supreme Court nominees in
the hope of preserving the vacancies for Presidents from their
party.18 And we have not yet mentioned a nominee’s likely ideology or
how well a potential candidate interviews for the job as possible
complicating factors.
Nor have I yet acknowledged other, arguably more serious problems with collective assumptions about merit. First, we still have to
demonstrate empirically our collective assumptions about merit. It is
one thing to assume we share some consensus on merit, but we need
to show precisely what, if anything, our shared assumptions are.
This requires figuring out whose opinions ought to count and how to
18. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4.
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figure them out. Second, even if there were shared assumptions
about merit, there may not be any consensus on what kinds of activities or data satisfy our shared criteria for merit. For instance, it is
possible there is relatively widespread consensus on the relevance of
professional experience to judicial selection but not on which experiences ought to count or on the relative weight (or relevance) of different kinds of experience (say, public defender versus federal prosecutor). Third, there may not be any consensus on the relative weight of
different factors, such as experience and judicial temperament. People might have reasonable differences of opinion about how to prioritize different factors or whether one factor ought to count more than
another. Nor may there be any consensus on the significance of an
absent factor or how much weight to attach to a negative rating with
respect to a particular criterion, such as judicial temperament.
Again, people might have reasonable differences of opinion about
what needs to be shown in order to disqualify a nominee altogether.
The large number of potential considerations helps to explain why
some Presidents, or their advisers, might prefer to break the nominating process into first- and second-order selection criteria. The first
might allow for a relatively sizeable list of potential candidates, while
the second might be used to cut the list down to size (if not down to
one). Interviews might be used to cut a narrowed list even further (at
which point, of course, a great deal depends on who is doing the interview, the questions asked, and the nominees’ responses).
It is possible that recognizing the large number of potential considerations discourages academics from pondering the qualifications
of ideal nominees to the Court and other Article III courts. Academics might view such an exercise as futile, for they appreciate that judicial nominees are not chosen in vacuums. Yet neither Senators nor
academics hesitate to evaluate nominees, particularly those to the
Supreme Court, on the basis of some criteria. The question thus remains as to the appropriate criteria for measuring the quality of a
particular nomination. Of course, the fact that a nomination falls
short of an ideal is not necessarily an argument against it. Supreme
Court nominees usually enter the confirmation phase with at least a
presumption, or likelihood, that they will be confirmed.19 It thus usually takes some rather significant things—not just some deviation
from an ideal—to put nominations in trouble. Nevertheless, the
stronger nominees’ credentials (or the more closely they approximates an ideal), the tougher it may be to undermine their nomination. Thus, looking at another way to determine ideal credentials

19. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal
Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 479-81 (1998).
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might be fruitful for providing at least one significant measure for
evaluating the relative strengths of particular nominations.
2. Determining Merit in Reverse
Part II.C.1, supra, examined possible judicial selection criteria on
which there might be consensus. This section considers determining
qualifications by looking at merit in reverse. It considers whether it
is possible to infer from the Justices we might generally agree were
“great” or “excellent” what they might have had in common prior to
their appointments. The question is whether the signs of at least potential “greatness” or “excellence” were evident at the times of the
appointments of Justices who later proved themselves to be first-rate
Justices.
I illustrate this tack through two examples. The first is Justice
Benjamin Cardozo. His name appears on most lists of great Justices,20 so the question naturally arises whether, or in what ways,
Justice Cardozo’s greatness or excellence was evident at the time of
his nomination. Throughout his career—first as a lawyer specializing
in appellate briefs (from 1891 to 1913), then as a judge (since 1914)
and later chief judge (since 1926) of the New York Court of Appeals—
Cardozo, nominally a Democrat, had enjoyed the confidence of all political factions.21 Achieving this level of confidence was especially significant because he had done it in an era when state courts (and his
court especially) were widely revered. Cardozo was also the author of
several highly regarded books and had received honorary degrees
from many universities, including Yale, Columbia (his alma mater),
and Harvard.22 Many of his decisions in such areas as torts and contracts influenced judges and courts throughout the nation. Thus, he
evidently had, by the time of his appointment, compiled ample judicial experience, shown considerable legal acumen, and demonstrated
excellent judicial temperament, collegiality, and leadership on a leading court. At the time of his appointment, Cardozo’s integrity and
character were beyond reproach.
My second example involves another New Yorker, Charles Evans
Hughes, whom many believe was a first-rate jurist (not once but
twice!).23 When Hughes was first nominated and confirmed to the

20. See, e.g., LEADERS OF THE PACK: POLLS & CASE STUDIES OF GREAT SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES 10-12 (William D. Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds., 2003) [hereinafter LEADERS]; Albert P. Blaustein & Roy M. Mersky, Rating Supreme Court Justices, 58
A.B.A. J. 1183, 1183 (1972); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN
REPUTATION (1990).
21. See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998) (detailing Cardozo’s legal career).
22. For a brief account of Cardozo’s legal training at Columbia, see id. at 40-50.
23. See LEADERS, supra note 20, at 187-88.
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Supreme Court in 1910, he already had outstanding credentials.24 He
had been an active practitioner with one of the leading law firms in
the country, been a leader of the New York and national bars, and
devoted himself to substantial public service. At the time President
Taft appointed Hughes as an Associate Justice, Hughes was serving
with distinction as the Governor of New York. As an Associate Justice, Hughes authored a number of significant opinions, demonstrated respect for his colleagues and opposing arguments, and displayed an evenhanded temperament. After leaving the Court six
years later to run unsuccessfully for President of the United States,25
he served as president of the American Bar Association;26 argued
several cases successfully before the Supreme Court (and performed
significant pro bono work); served for four years as Secretary of State
under Presidents Harding and Coolidge (1921-1925);27 and served on
the Permanent Court of International Justice, or World Court (19281929).28 Few nominees to the Court have ever matched Hughes’ record of public service prior to either of his appointments to the Court,
and fewer had records of public service that commanded the respect
of the leaders of both parties (though this did not save him from having a significant minority of Senators vote against his nomination as
Chief Justice for fear of his allegiance to big business29). Hughes
brought statesmanship to the task of judging.
My point is not to suggest that either Cardozo or Hughes ought to
be the ideal model of a Supreme Court Justice or Chief Justice.
Rather, my point is that if we are sincerely interested in measuring
merit, we might consider inferring from certain nominees’ records,
during their respective appointments, appropriate criteria for meritorious appointments to the Court. But we rarely do. This may be because we rarely take merit into consideration without some reference
to ideology. Many, if not most, of us might suspect that most Presidents and Senators are preoccupied with ideology in assessing judicial nominees. Consequently, we need to consider the implications of
the linkage of merit to ideology in the federal judicial selection process.

24. See SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT 1-15
(1951).
25. See id. at 68-71.
26. 2 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 587 (1951).
27. HENDEL, supra note 24, at 74-77.
28. 2 PUSEY, supra note 26, at 640-47.
29. HENDEL, supra note 24, at 78-90 (discussing the debate over Hughes’s nomination
to the position of Chief Justice).
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D. Assumptions on Which Few People Agree
A fourth way to define merit is through assumptions on which few
people agree. It is possible that many, or even most, of us might
agree that ideology is pertinent to judicial selection, though we might
not agree on the particular ideology that we would prefer for judicial
nominees to have.
Indeed, no one seriously thinks that President George W. Bush
has been using the same criteria that President Clinton employed in
choosing which people to nominate to district and circuit court judgeships. Instead, we strongly suspect (based on leaks and outcomes)
that President Bush is considering different sets of people from those
that President Clinton considered nominating as judges. The differences in their nominees go beyond party affiliations or allegiances;
they reflect differences in experience, political commitments and service, and attitudes about how to decide constitutional cases. These
attitudes are what some people might call ideological commitments.
Yet it is reasonable to wonder whether there are any selection criteria on which Presidents Bush and Clinton (or their respective advisers) would agree. (Presidents Clinton and Bush apparently did
agree on two nominees—Judges Roger Gregory and Barrington
Parker, Jr.—whom they nominated and who were ultimately confirmed by the Republican-led Senate in 2001.30) Presidents Clinton
and Bush (and their supporters and advisers) each have claimed that
they nominated the best-qualified people as federal judges, but these
claims beg the question: how do we determine merit, or who are the
best-qualified people for judicial appointments? It is not immediately
clear why or how both Presidents could be appointing the bestqualified people given that they appear to have been nominating
quite different kinds of people to judgeships—people with different
backgrounds, political experience, party affiliations, sponsors, and
attitudes.
Given these circumstances, a typical refrain from scholars is to insist that ideology matters, because it frequently makes the critical
difference in whom the President nominates or whom the Senate confirms to Article III courts, and thus we need to focus on the likely
ideologies of judicial nominees in evaluating whether they ought to
30. In his final year in office, President Clinton nominated Roger Gregory and Barrington Parker, Jr., to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and for the Second
Circuit, respectively. The Senate never acted on those nominations. Consequently, President Clinton in his last month in office designated both nominees as recess appointees to
their respective courts of appeals. These appointments would have expired at the end of
the next congressional session. However, in March of his first year in office, President
George W. Bush announced his first set of nominees to the federal courts of appeals, including Gregory to the Fourth Circuit and Parker to the Second Circuit. David G. Savage,
Bush Picks 11 for Federal Bench, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A1.
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be confirmed. Walter Dellinger’s proposed solution to the impasse
over some of President Bush’s judicial nominees has the distinct virtue of smoking out whether ideology is what matters most to each
side.31 He proposes that each President ought to agree to nominate at
least one of a preselected few people approved by the opposition party
in exchange for a relatively smooth confirmation process for every
three or four people he prefers to appoint to a particular circuit court
of appeals. For instance, in exchange for his getting Miguel Estrada,
Bret Kavanaugh, and Tom Griffith appointed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia,32 President Bush would be
obliged to nominate someone from a group of potential nominees approved by the Democratic caucus in the Senate. If the President were
to refuse, Dellinger argues, then it can only be because he clearly
prefers to zealously protect his prerogative to take ideology into account in nominating judges.
Dellinger poses a powerful test of presidential commitment to
ideological criteria for judicial nominations. Nevertheless, it is possible that Presidents may zealously protect their nominating authority
(as did, for instance, Presidents Tyler and Madison in the nineteenth
century33) for reasons other than the desire to ensure the ideological
purity of their judicial nominations. Presidents may wish to preserve
their autonomy to nominate people to judgeships for such other reasons as rewarding personal or party fealty, currying the favor of particular Senators or constituencies, and broadening the diversity of
the federal judiciary. Of course, none of these reasons for appointment is mutually exclusive from fulfilling certain ideological criteria.
It is possible that Presidents, or at least their advisers, might define
merit as an additional criterion for nomination or perhaps as the
critical factor for choosing among potential nominees or for determining the potential sets of nominees for particular judgeships. Indeed,
some Presidents, or their advisers, might define merit as including a
particular ideological orientation with respect to constitutional interpretation. It is not unprecedented by any means for Presidents to select people as nominees based on the extent to which the nominees
conform to the presidents’ notions as to the duties they expect judges
or Justices to perform. President Reagan, I suggested earlier, seems
31. Walter Dellinger, Broaden the Slate, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2003, at A23.
32. Miguel Estrada, Bret Kavanaugh, and Thomas Griffith are three Bush nominees
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on which the Senate never acted.
Democrats successfully blocked a floor vote on Estrada’s nomination, while the Judiciary
Committee, as of the date of our Symposium, never acted on either Kavanaugh’s or Griffith’s nomination. I do not know Estrada personally, but I do know both Kavanaugh and
Griffith, both of whom very kindly and generously have given their time to visit, more than
once, my constitutional law classes.
33. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 53-55 (rev. ed.
2003).
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to have defined merit, at least in part, as including certain ideological commitments.34 He insisted that his staff and Senators recommend candidates for judicial nominations that fit particular criteria,
including a rigid commitment to original understanding in all cases.
Thus there are administrations that define merit in terms of ideology.
The fact that administrations—and a number of commentators—
define merit in terms of, or in part based on, ideology leads some empirical researchers to do the same. For instance, Segal and Spaeth
measure the attitudes, or ideologies, of judges and Justices based on
newspaper editorials at the time of their respective appointments,35
while Lee Epstein and Gary King have suggested determining nominees’ ideologies based on the Senators sponsoring them.36 But Senators sponsor nominees for many different reasons, not the least of
which is payback for political support or fealty. Some Senators also
may not care about ideology or make assumptions about nominees’
ideologies based on what others tell them. Moreover, of course, as
others have suggested, one of the nation’s most important appellate
courts—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia—is
not within a state. The District of Columbia has no Senators, and
thus senatorial courtesy does not work in the same way for its judges
as it does for those from the fifty states. An additional complication is
that some states do not have any Senators from the President’s
party, in which case they have no input on nominations or the President pays more attention to what the highest elected official within
the state from his party has to say about prospective nominations. In
short, it is possible that sponsoring Senators signal nominees’ possible commitments to particular ideologies, if and only if the Senators
are well known (and can be shown) to prefer nominees with such
commitments.
Empiricists should also consider three other possible measures of
ideology. The first is simply to look at how different organizations
characterize nominees’ judicial attitudes. These definitions are
unlikely to be neutral; they are as likely to be self-serving as the assessments of any other parties with vested interests in the fates of
particular judicial nominations. A second measure might be reflected
in the nominees’ activities with organizations whose members are
known to have or share particular attitudes about constitutional law.
The problem with this standard is that it is unclear how many or
even which activities demonstrate ideological commitments that will
carry over into judging. Moreover, some nominees might not have
34. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
35. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 204.
36. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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fixed attitudes about constitutional law generally or in particular
fields. Third, researchers could identify which materials are pertinent for demonstrating nominees’ judicial attitudes and assess
nominees’ attitudes on the basis of those materials. For instance,
nominees’ speeches or law review articles might reflect certain ideological commitments. This might be especially pertinent for nominees
to appellate courts, particularly the Supreme Court. Whereas district
court judges are presumably bound by the opinions of the federal
court of appeals within their respective circuit, appellate judges are
bound by Supreme Court opinions, but less so, and sometimes not at
all, by the opinions of other panels within their respective circuits.
The extent to which judges may not be strictly tethered by precedent
requires examining the various other bases on which they might
ground their opinions. The problems with this approach are, however, that some nominees might not have produced any extrajudicial
writings, some writings or speeches might not reveal much about judicial nominees’ attitudes, and the nominees can credibly argue that
the speeches or articles are irrelevant because scholars and judges
are not subject to the same constraints. Scholars are free to analyze
legal questions on the basis of whatever sources they consider to be
appropriate, while judges, even appellate ones, are not. The latter
are duty-bound to assess legal questions on the basis of a relatively
narrow range of materials, including precedent.
It is possible that measuring merit is complicated by yet one more
factor: We have no consensus on whose opinion ought to matter in
evaluating merit. Law professors, practitioners, and even other
judges may have special insights into what jurists do, but there is
good reason to think that none of these groups are perfectly neutral.
Each group qualifies as an external source of authority on merit, but
each group’s members may only employ the conceptions of merit in
which they have vested interests, with each gravitating toward the
judges and Justices with whose opinions they tend to agree.
None of the deficiencies of particular definitions of merit, however,
make empirical studies of judicial performance and selection impossible. We need not settle on a normative conception of merit on which
everyone in the world can agree. What we need are normative criteria that are at least coherent, credible, and comprehensive. The next
Part examines the missing element in most empirical research on judicial selection that precludes it from being as comprehensive and
precise as it ought to be.
III. THE BATTLE OVER THE MAINSTREAM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The reasons for the attraction, or dominance, of ideology in judicial selection are obvious. First, national political leaders care about
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ideology because of the high stakes involved in judicial appointments. They understand that Article III judges enjoy life tenure and
thus are immune from political retaliation against their decisions.
Judicial opinions on constitutional law cannot be overturned through
ordinary legislation but only through the extraordinary means of reversal by constitutional amendment or by a superior court (for federal district and appellate courts) or by the Supreme Court (for its
own opinions). Consequently, national political leaders devote a good
deal of time trying to ensure that the people appointed as judges and
Justices will exercise power in ways that are satisfactory to them.
Second, national political leaders have almost no incentive to
reach any consensus on merit. Most citizens pay little or no attention
to lower court appointments, so leaders can expect little or no public
backlash to their decisions on lower court appointments. Moreover,
Presidents and Senators are reluctant to relinquish their institutional prerogatives in the selection process. If they ever do so, it is
only in exchange for something else that they have decided is more
important to them (at least for the moment). Presidents and Senators
might sometimes have incentives to reach accommodations, but accommodations are much harder to come by for Presidents and Senators from the opposition party. Presidents from one party and Senators from the other often need conflict to sharpen the differences between them and to call attention to the stakes involved in the selection process. Bipartisan agreement on a general definition of merit
would merely reduce, rather than preserve or expand, Senators’ discretion in subsequent confirmation proceedings. It would tie Senators’ hands in specific confirmation contests. Merit gets attention
when there is a political advantage in addressing it.
The most intense confirmation contests between Republicans and
Democrats focus not on merit but rather on the contours of the mainstream in constitutional law. Each side claims that its nominees are
in the mainstream and that the other side’s contested nominees are
outside it. For instance, Senators opposed to the Bork nomination argued that he was outside the mainstream of constitutional law, while
his defenders argued that his scholarship and thinking was well
within it.37 More recently, Democrats have supported six filibusters
against judicial nominees whose views on constitutional issues are,
in the Democrats’ judgment, outside of the mainstream. The defenders have argued that just the opposite is true.38

37. See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA (1989).
38. See Neil A. Lewis, G.O.P. Seeks to Ease Rules on Filibusters of Judgeships, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2003, at A15.
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The contest to define the mainstream has not just been rhetorical.
A good deal is at stake. Each side desperately wants its nominees to
be viewed as occupying the middle, rather than the extreme end or
outside, of the spectrum in constitutional law. The middle is the safest, strongest ground. Moreover, opposing nominees, because they
are outside the mainstream, puts the other side on the defensive.
More important, each side appreciates the enormous stakes involved,
for with each victory each side advances one step further in building
a foundation for an enduring constitutional vision. The vision is important in guiding not just other judicial nominations but also the
exercise of presidential and legislative authority. The prize is shaping constitutional law for as far into the future as possible.
While it is not hard to understand why political leaders care intensely about securing the mainstream—or the middle—in constitutional law, it is harder for someone outside of (or not invested in) the
process to determine what counts as the middle. While this determination would be useful for analyzing the claims of the opposing sides
in defining the mainstream, I consider in Part III.A some of the difficulties with determining the mainstream in constitutional law. With
these difficulties in mind, I then propose ways in which we might
figure out the mainstream, or the middle, in constitutional law.
A. Problems with Defining the Middle in Constitutional Law
There are several major problems with identifying the middle
ground in contemporary constitutional law. First, empirical analysis
cannot easily capture what counts as the middle because the choices
of what to emphasize or count are value-laden. Anyone looking to define the middle, or the mainstream (and the two are not necessarily
the same), in constitutional law must make judgments about relevance: Are all cases relevant? Should we only look at the judgments
or outcomes in particular cases, or should we also look at the reasoning (including its quality and extent)? Where, for instance, do seemingly obvious cases like Roe v. Wade,39 Lawrence v. Texas,40 and Lee v.
Weisman41 fit? Some might argue that they are clearly on the “left” in
constitutional law, but others might argue that they are consistent
with a libertarian perspective on the “right.” Arguing that one or the
other of these positions is correct is just another value judgment.
Second, an even more serious problem with defining the middle or
the mainstream in constitutional law is that neither the categories
we employ in assessing judicial performance nor many nominees’
constitutional views are fixed. Because of the phenomenon of ideo39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
41. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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logical drift, categories are not static; particular perspectives on constitutional law associated with particular political factions may over
time be appropriated by or become associated with different political
factions.42 For instance, Chief Justice John Marshall reflected a “conservative” rather than a “liberal” perspective on constitutional law,
because he usually favored the status quo. His successor as Chief
Justice of the United States, Roger Taney, was understood, at the
time of his appointment, as representing a “liberal” perspective on
constitutional law because he was thought to favor progressive legislation and reform of the status quo.43 It is only because of ideological
drift that each is now viewed differently.44 New Deal liberals found
they had a lot in common with the opinions of Chief Justice Marshall, because of their consistent support for a strong national government; and conservatives admired Taney’s ardent efforts to resist
the expansion of the national government at the expense of state
sovereignty.
The labels “liberal” and “conservative” do not fit contemporary
Justices much better. For instance, Justice John Paul Stevens, appointed to the Court in 1976 by President Ford, is frequently described as a “liberal” by commentators and critics.45 Yet he hardly
seems to have much in common with other “liberals” such as Associate Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, with whom he
sat for many years. Nor does it seem appropriate to describe Justices
Kennedy and O’Connor as strictly “conservative” simply because they
have often favored protecting state sovereignty in Commerce Clause46
and Eleventh Amendment cases.47 They also have voted to reaffirm
the embattled decision of Roe v. Wade,48 to strike down antisodomy
laws in Lawrence v. Texas,49 and to strike down the Virginia Military

42. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial Restraint to the Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 637-38 (2002).
43. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lives of John Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1399 (2002).
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2001 Term, 30
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307, 311, passim (2003); Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of
Supreme Court Justices’ Decision Making, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 737 (2000).
46. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (majority opinion of Rehnquist,
C.J., joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 568-83 (1995).
47. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (majority opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996) (majority opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.).
48. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter, JJ.).
49. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (majority opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.); id. at 579-85 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).

2005]

SELECTION BY THE NUMBERS

1219

Institute’s policy to exclude women.50 It is conceivably more accurate
to describe Justices Kennedy and O’Connor as moderates, though
many Senators would resist doing so because it would cede the middle ground to these Justices rather than to others they might prefer
to place there.
A third problem with fixing the middle ground in constitutional
law is that Justices and judges sometimes shift their attitudes about
constitutional law either generally or in particular cases. Justice
Harry Blackmun is often described as evolving, or growing, over time
into a more “liberal” justice.51 Others might move in the other direction. Segal and Spaeth claim, inter alia, that Justices Stevens and
Souter each became more “liberal” over time, while Justice White became more “conservative” over time.52 As Chief Justice, William
Rehnquist has sometimes been said to have moderated some views,53
as he arguably did in writing the Court’s opinions reaffirming
Miranda v. Arizona,54 concurring in United States v. Virginia,55 and
upholding the Family Leave Act as an exercise of Congress’s authority pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.56
Some people seem to assume that most nominees have ideological
precommitments at the times of their nominations that are impervious to change, but it is impossible to prove that this is true, especially when the nominees themselves disclaim holding any such
commitments.
Fourth, legal academics have done little to illuminate what may
fall inside or outside the mainstream of constitutional law. Most legal scholars appear interested less in finding common ground than in
delivering the knock-out punch against opposing points of view.57 A
common goal of legal scholarship is paradigm-shifting, but in pursuing this goal, legal scholars will dismiss as wrong or dangerous
points of view affiliated with the paradigm they are trying to undo.
The pursuit of this goal is not likely to enrich our understanding of
50. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (majority opinion of Ginsburg, J.,
joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.).
51. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 316 (1993).
52. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 218.
53. A number of suggestions have been made as to why Chief Justice Rehnquist
seems to have moderated some views. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda to
§ 3501 to Dickerson to . . ., 99 MICH. L. REV. 879, 889-92 (2001).
54. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (upholding Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
55. 518 U.S. at 558-66 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
56. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
57. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by Half: The Problem with Novelty in Constitutional Law, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 921 (2001) (noting that in many scholarly discussions of the
counter-majoritarian difficulty, “grandtheory” tends to dominate over simpler and more
coherent arguments).
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which views actually do, rather than ought to, fall within the mainstream of American constitutional law.
Fifth, the media hinders sophisticated discussions of judicial performance. The media has begun to shirk its traditional role in educating the public. It has moved from reporting “hard” news, or facts
and figures, to reporting “soft” news, or speculation and commentary.58 The proliferation of media outlets and twenty-four-hour news
has put enormous pressure on newspapers and television reporters to
emphasize scandal. The media prefers drama and conflict, because it
gets people’s attention. As candidates and commentators increasingly
feel the need to characterize opponents in extreme terms, the media
follows suit. Candidates are thus “liberal” or “conservative,” and Justices are also one or the other. No one, apparently, begins as a moderate or ends up as one. From the perspective of the media, the middle in politics is nothing more than the otherwise unoccupied ground
that the candidates fight to control, while the media simply covers
the flashier portions of the fight.
B. Sketching the Middle
Assessing judicial ideologies is difficult without having some
yardstick with which to measure them. One cannot talk about extreme views, or views falling outside of the mainstream, without
clarifying which views are not extreme, or do not fall outside the
mainstream. It is possible that the measurement of an ideology is a
purely normative matter, depending on its appeal to lawmakers and
its consistency with constitutional law as they understand it. Even
then we need to define the middle, or moderation, as a means of
curbing reckless or misleading rhetoric. We need our rhetoric to fit
the complicated business of judging. So the question is how accurately can we describe a middle course or the contours of the mainstream in constitutional law.
I offer a few possible answers, with each of the difficulties described above in mind. First, we can identify the middle ground as
that which each of the contending sides in confirmation contests is
trying desperately to occupy. We can define it, in other words, as an
aspiration. We can assess nominees based on how well they fit the
description of the middle ground, or mainstream, of their supporters.
One problem with this definition is that it might allow one side to define the terms on which it prefers for its nominees to be assessed,
without any second-guessing; however, this understanding of the
mainstream puts pressure on supporters of particular nominations to

58. See Hess, supra note 9.
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be careful about how they characterize nominees or risk having the
latter fail to meet expectations.
Second, we could define the mainstream as comprised of the pool
of people who successfully made it through the judicial nomination
process. They constitute a large and diverse pool, which reflects the
approval of the governing elite. The problem with this understanding
of the mainstream is that it fails to take into account the fact that
many people make it through the process without close scrutiny.
Many of the people confirmed also might not have had fixed views at
the time of their appointments or might change their views over
time. In addition, it is not clear why we should ever define the mainstream based on what judges and Justices actually do, because they
act independent from the governing elite once they are confirmed.
Indeed, most judges and Justices serve long after the political coalition or majorities who chose the people responsible for their appointments have ceased to exist. For instance, John Marshall served
most of his long tenure as Chief Justice long after the demise of the
Federalist party with which he had been associated.
Moreover, defining the mainstream as those whom the Senate has
confirmed merely gives each side an incentive to push the envelope.
With each victory in the confirmation process, each party has expanded the possibilities for its nominees. Once people are confirmed,
their parties can point to them as examples, or precedents, to guide
future confirmation proceedings.
A more interesting but speculative test might be to ask whether
the President would still nominate or the Senate still approve the
same judge if they knew what kinds of decisions the judges would
make. In many cases, nominees are relatively blank slates, and, in
any event, judges and Justices presumably fulfill special obligations
independent from presidential and senatorial influence. So it might
not be fair to attribute to Presidents and Senators all the decisions
made by the judges and Justices they have approved.
Third, the mainstream could be understood as simply consisting of
the views of those at the center of the Court. These days that would
presumably be Justice O’Connor, because she rarely dissented in the
2003 Term.59 The problem is that she did not decide these cases
alone, and it is unclear why those with whom she joined in majority
opinions ought to be excluded from the mainstream. Moreover, the
center can shift, and there is no guarantee that Justice O’Connor will
be there as often next year. Nor is it clear why dissenters ought to be
excluded entirely, because dissents sometimes later become the law.

59. See Linda Greenhouse, In a Momentous Term, Justices Remake the Law, and the
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at A1.
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The fourth and final possibility is to define the mainstream as
something more dynamic and broader than a specific Court or specific Justice at a particular moment in time. The Court is not alone in
making constitutional law. Our political leaders make a great deal of
constitutional law, much of which eludes judicial review.60 Moreover,
the Court approves the vast majority of the constitutional decisions
that it does review. It would also be wrong to assume that every Supreme Court decision reflects mainstream constitutional values.
Sometimes the Court gets it wrong, as it did in Chisholm v. Georgia,61 Dred Scott v. Sandford,62 and Korematsu v. United States.63 The
constitutional views of Presidents and Senators are relevant to the
makeup of the mainstream, because they have the power to try to
move the Court in different directions (or perhaps keep it on course)
by virtue of their respective authorities in the appointments process.
They also have the power to shape the size, direction, and priorities
of the federal government. Moreover, Presidents and members of
Congress perform critical roles in approving enduring constitutional
changes and in settling constitutional crises—failures within the
Constitution to provide solutions to certain kinds of disputes.64 Consequently, it is possible to define the mainstream as the dominant
doctrine, outlook, and thinking on constitutional law in a given period. The Court provides formal doctrine, the courts and national and
state political leaders shape the constitutional outlook of a particular
era, and all of these along with constitutional commentators and historians (in a wide variety of fora) provide critical thinking on constitutional law. This perspective on the mainstream has the virtue of
encapsulating the constitutional activities of a given era. Its problem
is that there is no method on which all people could agree for determining the relevant doctrine, outlook, and thinking of a particular
era. Historians might be in the best position to pull this information
together, but only in retrospective. It is a challenge, to say the least,
for someone to step outside of his or her own time to develop a credible perspective on it. Time does not stand still for any person or any
thing, and none of the things that we might think are essential for
shaping the mainstream—doctrine, outlook, and critical thought—
are purely static.

60. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 51 DRAKE L. REV.
775 (2003).
61. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
62. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
63. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
64. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Crisis and Constitutionalism, 63 MONT. L. REV. 277
(2002).
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IV. PROVING (HOW MUCH) IDEOLOGY MATTERS
Proving that ideology is a dominant factor in the judicial selection
process—as many people suppose—is no small feat. There are a
number of complications with determining the extent to which ideology was a major factor or the primary basis for the President’s nomination and the Senate’s confirmation of various judicial nominees.
Below, I first review these problems and then offer some modest suggestions for future empirical analysis on the significance of ideology
in the judicial selection process.
A. Fixing Ideology
There are a number of problems with proving empirically whether
and, if so, how much ideology was a factor in the nominating or confirmation phase. To be sure, this is a question that social scientists
have spent considerable time and effort trying to answer.65 Nevertheless, several problems persist. First, reaching consensus on what
qualifies as ideology is difficult. While I personally understand ideology as a precommitment to certain constitutional values or to resolving particular questions of constitutional law, regardless of the facts
of particular cases, this is but one understanding.66 Indeed, people
widely disagree over how to define ideology and even whether Presidents and Senators have taken ideology into account in the appointments process. Consequently, one difficulty with proving that ideology matters in the selection process is adopting a credible definition
of ideology.
The second problem is that it is a mistake to assume that every
judicial nominee has a well-conceived or thoroughly worked-out constitutional ideology. It is possible that many, even most, do, but judicial nominees often publicly disavow commitment to a particular
constitutional ideology. Moreover, ideology presumably functions as a
blinding mechanism, so that it is conceivable that some nominees
may not be aware that they have certain ideological commitments.
Third, and perhaps most important, the relevance of ideology to
particular judges’ decisions or to particular confirmation decisions
may not be evident in the public record. If the President and his
nominees deny that the latter have particular ideological commitments, then the burden shifts to the other side to prove them wrong.
65. See, e.g., Charles M. Cameron et al., Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A
Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525 (1990); Jeffrey Segal, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: Partisan and Institutional Politics, 49 J. POL. 998 (1987);
Jeffrey A. Segal et al., The Role of Ideology in Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 77 KY. L.J. 485 (1988-89); Donald R. Songer, The Relevance of Policy Values for the
Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 927 (1979).
66. See, e.g., David W. Minar, Ideology and Political Behavior, 5 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI.
317 (1961) (noting different conceptions and definitions of ideology).
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This is precisely the dynamic with President Bush’s judicial nominations. He has publicly defended his nominations on the ground of
merit, and he has disavowed that he has employed a litmus test or
chosen nominees based on particular ideological commitments.67 His
nominees also publicly disavow such commitments.68 Consequently,
skeptical Democrats must infer his selection criteria—including any
preference for ideological precommitments—from the kinds of nominees that he has chosen.
Moreover, most judicial nominations do not fail because the Senate formally rejects them. They fail because of inaction. Senate rules
provide that a nomination lapses unless the Senate has acted on it
before the end of the current legislative session, and if they do not,
the nominations fail. For instance, in President Clinton’s final year
in office the Senate failed to act on more than sixty of his judicial
nominations.69 There is little or no record on these nominees, so it is
not possible to prove precisely why the Judiciary Committee did not
hold hearings or votes on these nominees. The official record is silent
on why these nominations failed.
To complicate matters further, the Senate debates that do occur
over nominees rarely employ the term “ideology.” More often than
not, the focus in confirmation contests has been on such matters as
the nominee’s integrity, experience, competence, and temperament.70
When the debates do shift focus to nominees’ commitments to (or expression of) particular constitutional views, they feature discussions
about whether the nominee comes from the “mainstream” of constitutional law.
Fourth, proving that ideology significantly matters to the fates of
judicial nominations is complicated by the fact that Presidents and
Senators rarely base their decisions in the appointments process on a
single factor. Presidents, or their counselors, usually employ a range
of criteria for making decisions on whom to nominate.71 In the Senate, a single factor is not necessarily determinative. It is possible
that Senators might initially be disposed against particular nominations for one or two basic reasons, but their public opposition may not
necessarily be predicated on these. Nor is it unusual for Presidents
and Senators to base public decisions on factors they do not disclose.

67. Adam Nagourney & Robin Toner, In Final Debate, Clashes on Taxes and Health
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004, at A1.
68. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Lawmakers Press Nominee, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2002, at
A5.
69. See Peter Hardin, Bush Rescinds Offer to Gregory; Remains Eligible for Federal
Bench, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 20, 2001, at A1.
70. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the Nomination and
Confirmation of Justice Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 969 (1992).
71. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 4.
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It is not incumbent upon our national leaders to disclose all the
grounds for their constitutional decisions.
Moreover, Presidents and Senators must make different kinds of
decisions in the selection process. Because Presidents are responsible
for choosing nominees, they can make decisions about which persons
they think are best qualified or best fit their selection criteria. Senators use a different calculus. While they are often able to provide input (and even make specific recommendations) on nominations, their
primary responsibility is to determine, not necessarily whether the
nominee is ideal or the best qualified, but rather whether the nominee is acceptable according to whatever criteria each Senator decides
is relevant. It is thus not unthinkable that 100 different Senators
may use 100 different sets of criteria for evaluating judicial nominees.
B. How to Show Ideology Matters
The aforementioned problems are not necessarily fatal to the enterprise of proving that ideology makes a difference to outcomes in
the confirmation process. Patterns invariably emerge within the process. For instance, the Senate usually (but not always) approves the
vast majority of a President’s judicial nominations. One could thus
try to identify what successful nominees have in common or what
traits or characteristics are shared by unsuccessful nominees. These
are not necessarily easy ventures, but they are not impossible. For
instance, social scientists, including David Yalof, have shown what
they regard as the characteristics that the people nominated to the
Supreme Court over the past few decades have had in common.72
Once one sets out to demonstrate the particular significance of a
single factor, such as ideology, the task becomes somewhat more
complicated. To make this showing, one needs to first determine the
relevant independent and dependent variables.73 The variable that is
to be explained—in the case of the confirmation process, the vote
share (or how Senators voted on particular nominations) or the absence of a vote on a particular nomination—is the dependent variable; it “depends,” or turns, on other variables. The latter are what
social scientists call independent or “explanatory” variables, because
they help to explain the dependent variable. The independent or explanatory variables are not themselves explained by the theory one is
trying to prove; they simply do the explaining. The effects of these
variables are called coefficients. Mapping the coefficients on graphs
72. DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999); see also Epstein et al., supra note 1.
73. For an excellent primer on statistical analysis, see RAY C. FAIR, PREDICTING
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND OTHER THINGS (2002).
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(to determine the points at which the variables intercept) and testing
the coefficients are relatively sophisticated steps, which must be
done in statistical analysis. But my point here is to clarify that, as an
empirical matter, ideology is not the outcome that needs to be
proved; instead, it is one of numerous variables that determine outcomes in the confirmation process. Thus, we need to determine the
relative impacts of ideology and other independent variables in the
confirmation process.
1. Proving Judicial Ideology
One cannot prove that ideology matters without initially determining how ideology manifests itself. Presumably, it must reflect
some commitment to a particular approach to constitutional interpretation, regardless of the facts of particular cases. So the challenge
for an empiricist is to track down and assess the intensity of a nominee’s expressions of any such ideological commitments. As I have
suggested, a common approach among social scientists is to find
these expressions by means of external indicators such as newspaper
editorials and sponsoring Senators, even though these indicators
may not all be reliable or credible. These indicators are by no means
the only ones. Indeed, I suggest almost a dozen possible indicators of
nominees’ ideological commitments, each of which can be empirically
measured.
First, if the nominees are judges, one can inspect their opinions.
Opinions merit special attention because judges speak through them.
They have enormous potential to reveal what, if any, ideological
commitments are at work. If opinions contain judges’ explicit acknowledgments of ideological commitments, they ought to be given
special weight, particularly because judges are not obliged to make
such acknowledgments in constitutional adjudication. If opinions instead reflect patterns of decisionmaking, then these too merit special
consideration. This is especially true if the patterns relate to methodology or prioritization of sources of decision.
Second, nominees’ writings and speeches might illuminate their
ideological commitments. These materials are important, to some degree, because some people are nominated in part because of the views
expressed within them. Their writings and speeches are important,
in other words, because they attracted attention from the right people. If nominees’ writings and speeches contain the nominees’ admissions of certain ideological commitments, they merit special weight.
If they do not, then patterns in methodology or prioritization of
sources could become relevant, especially if they are nearly or absolutely uniform.
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Alternatively, one could merely award a number to a nominee,
which would be based on the number of his or her extrajudicial writings on controversial subjects. The actual content of these writings
may be less important than the number, because it is possible (and
thus one would need to show) that the larger the number of writings
on controversial subjects, the more a nominee has opened himself or
herself to attack for his or her views on those subjects. (It is, of
course, also possible that nominees can make controversial statements about relatively mundane topics.) Thus, especially prolific constitutional scholars would likely receive very high numbers, which
could be negatively weighted because of the likelihood that some
Senators will try to use their writings against them.
Fourth, other possible indicators of ideological commitments may
be nominees’ professional activities. Some activities are more revealing than others. For example, someone who has dedicated a great
deal of time to opposing the death penalty as unconstitutional is
likely to have a settled view on the matter. It is, however, possible for
some nominees to argue that their professional activities were
merely undertaken at the bidding of their superiors or clients. Thus
an empiricist needs to carefully screen nominees’ professional activities. The more they fall into controversial areas, the more negative
weight they can be given in the confirmation process.
Fifth, one might ask which groups support particular nominees
and on what bases. Groups no doubt might have different reasons to
support different nominees, but some groups may be well known for
preferring nominees with certain kinds of ideological commitments.
The preferences of the latter group might be particularly relevant,
especially if the group has identified the grounds for its approval of
the nomination.
Sixth, one could measure which groups are opposing which nominees and the grounds for their opposition. Of particular interest will
be the ones charging unacceptable ideological commitments. The
more groups that do this, the more likely Senators will know about
their opinion.
Alternatively, one could simply measure the numbers of witnesses
testifying for and against particular nominations. While this data is
obviously not available for nominees who never receive hearings, it
could be very useful for illuminating the dynamic within particular
confirmation contests. The larger the number of witnesses testifying,
the more likely it is to be significant. There must be a reason why
one nomination draws more witnesses than another. That reason
may or may not have anything to do with ideological commitments,
but it does bear on the nominee’s likely fate. So an empiricist needs
to determine the grounds on which witnesses testify for and against

1228

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1197

particular nominations, which can then be factored into his or her
analysis.
Seventh, one could consult an administration’s selection criteria.
Through their nominating authority, Presidents are able to set the
terms of debate in the confirmation process. If nominees are not presented based on their ideologies, the burden shifts to the other side,
and in practice it is hard for Senators on the defensive in the confirmation process to direct its results.
Eighth, empiricists ought to consider measuring the amount of
time devoted in hearings to discussing nominees’ ideologies. This requires counting not only the number of Senators’ statements and
questions pertaining to ideology but also how much time nominees
spend defending their judicial philosophies or explaining their supposed ideologies. It is hard to dismiss a large amount of attention as
nothing more than pretext. Even if it were, it shows the particular
role played by ideology in particular hearings.
A related empirical inquiry could be undertaken to simply measure how much time nominees spend defending themselves against
charges in their confirmation hearings. A rule of thumb in confirmation hearings is that the more time nominees spend testifying before
the Judiciary Committee (the “Committee”) the worse their chances
of confirmation become. This is not because they are bad witnesses,
though they may be. The concern, however, is that the longer the
nominee is required to testify, the more likely there is something
problematic about the nominee. Once these figures are determined,
they could be grouped according to the reasons for extended testimony.
Ninth, people who are not judges, even if they are academics, can
credibly claim that their public musings do not reflect what they
would do as judges because their duties as judges would require
them to abide by certain norms, such as following precedent, that
they are not bound to as scholars or commentators. These disclaimers are made under oath and thus need to be factored into empirical
analysis as well, for they shift the burden to the opposition not just to
disprove them but also to suggest the nominees lied under oath.
Tenth, a final measure of ideological commitments may come from
the testimony of those who claim to know the nominees best. What,
in other words, do the people who claim to have read the nominees’
writings or opinions claim about the nominees’ ideological commitments? This may not be entirely reliable, because many of the people
contacting or testifying before the Committee may have vested interests in the outcomes of the hearings. To avoid the latter problem, it
might be useful to examine whether these people are testifying
against their nominal parties’ interests. For instance, Michael
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McConnell benefited from having a number of prominent Democrats
urge the Committee to approve his nomination, even though some
Democratic Senators were disposed to be against it.74 While McConnell had produced a relatively high number of extrajudicial writings
on quite controversial subjects, that number could be reduced, or
counterbalanced, by a different number based on the size of the
group urging his confirmation against their own party’s supposed interest.
Last but not least, empiricists ought to consider examining all
failed nominations in order to determine what traits, if any, they had
in common. It is possible that they all, or most of them, attracted opposition based explicitly on ideological concerns. But they also might
have attracted opposition because of a confluence of several of the
other factors that are discussed infra in Parts IV.B.2 through
IV.B.10.
2. Senate Composition
Confirmation proceedings do not occur in a vacuum. Among the
other factors likely to have an impact on their outcomes is the Senate’s composition. Presidents often take the composition of the Senate into account in deciding whom to nominate and when. The representative strength of a President’s political party in the Senate is obviously important, because it determines which parties control the
Judiciary Committee, the agenda on the floor of the Senate, and the
length of debate. If the minority party controls at least forty seats in
the Senate, it can then block some judicial nominations by filibustering them.75 Threatening filibusters or temporary holds (which are, in
effect, mini-filibusters) can sometimes influence whether and when
Presidents make certain nominations.
The Senate composition can thus influence how quickly and even
how many nominations get through to the Senate floor for final
votes. If the opposing party controls the Senate, it raises the likelihood of obstruction of at least some judicial nominations. Hence if the
President’s party does not control the Senate, this number is likely to
be a negative coefficient. If, however, the President’s party does control the Senate, it is likely to be a positive one, and quite large if the
President’s party controls more than sixty seats. If the President’s
party controls a majority but less than sixty seats, it still merits a
positive coefficient, though the possibility of filibuster merits making
it not a very high one.
74. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Critic of Roe vs. Wade in Judiciary Hot Seat, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 19, 2002, at 15.
75. See Standing Rules of the Senate, S. DOC. NO. 106-15, R. XXII (2000), available at
http://www.rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule22.htm.
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3. Timing
Another factor that can potentially influence confirmation outcomes is timing. Election years tend not to be good times for Presidents to make judicial nominations, particularly to the Supreme
Court. In the nineteenth century, the Senate did not act on at least
nine Supreme Court nominations, supposedly because the majority
party was trying to keep the vacancies open until after the next
presidential election.76 In President Clinton’s final year in office, the
Senate did not act on more than sixty of his judicial nominations.77
Similarly, the Democratic-led Senate did not act on dozens of the
first President Bush’s judicial nominations in his final year in office,
presumably because of a desire to reserve as many judicial vacancies
as possible for the next President.78
Timing might matter in a different way. Most failed nominations
do not get so far as receiving Committee votes; they fail, as I have
suggested, because of inaction. Moreover, not all nominations that
get hearings are scheduled for Committee votes. Consequently, one
needs to figure out how long a nomination has gone without a hearing or whether it has gotten a Committee vote within a certain period
of time (presumably the average length of a time between a nomination and a Committee vote). Those nominations exceeding the average length of time without yet getting a hearing or Committee vote
will likely not be approved. Moreover, the closer a nomination comes
to being made near the end of a legislative session, the less delay is
needed to nullify it.
Consequently, timing can be quantified in at least three ways,
each negatively. The first is the extent to which it exceeds the average length of time for confirmation; the second is whether the nominations have been made in an election year; and the third is the extent to which a nomination was made with less time left in a session
than the average amount of time needed for confirmation.
4. Sponsoring Senators
Sponsoring Senators may make a difference to the fates of at least
some judicial nominees. The more powerful the Senator, the more
likely one might expect nominees he has supported to be confirmed.
For instance, the Senate has confirmed almost a half-dozen nominees
who at one time or another worked for Senator Orrin Hatch, the former Chair of the Judiciary Committee.79 Indeed, Senator Hatch convinced President Clinton to nominate a former aide to a district court
76.
77.
78.
79.

See ABRAHAM, supra note 4.
See Hardin, supra note 69.
See GOLDMAN, supra note 1.
Jonathan Groner, The Judge Maker, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 19, 2002, at 1.
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in Utah, after he had held up every other judicial nomination pending President Clinton’s compliance.80
5. Presidential Popularity
It is possible that a President’s popularity might have an effect on
a nomination’s fate. By popularity, I mean the President’s political
strength as reflected in, inter alia, his approval ratings with the public. These might show the risks involved in a fight with the President. The more closely a nomination is identified with the President
(or the more it means to him) or his policies, the more likely that the
popularity of the President or his policies will be an important factor.
The more popular the President or the policies with which the nominee is associated, the greater likelihood this popularity will benefit
his nomination. The more political coinage that a President has on
which to draw from in confirmation contests, the more likely Senators will suffer some political damage or loss from such confrontations. Some Senators might choose contests over some judicial nominations because they believe the conflicts can improve their standing
with important constituencies or can underscore their own political
commitments. But contests are not likely to be completely cost-free,
particularly insofar as Presidents remember them and have the
means and opportunity to seek retaliation.
A related factor may be party cohesion or fidelity. The extent to
which Senators from the same party are willing to stand together on
judicial nominations makes a big difference as to whether they can
successfully filibuster or defeat nominations in Committee or on the
Senate floor. The degree of cohesion or unity within a caucus is pertinent to how much power it can wield under the Senate rules and its
influence in striking deals with the President. Sometimes Senators
do not do what their party leaders or Presidents from their parties
tell them. Sometimes divisions in the ranks of the Senators from the
President’s party are a problem for many nominees, with some joining members of the opposition party to defeat them.
6. The Blue-Slip Process
Another factor with potential influence on the confirmation process is whether the (and which) blue-slip process is in place at the
time of a nomination.81 The blue-slip process allows a Senator to
block a nomination made to an office in that Senator’s home state.
This process is usually available to Senators from both parties, but
sometimes Presidents or Senate leaders have restricted it to Sena80. See GERHARDT, supra note 33, at 307.
81. On the blue-slip process, see Brannon P. Denning, The “Blue Slip”: Enforcing the
Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001).
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tors only from the President’s party. If this process is in place in either form, it expands Senators’ opportunities to block nominations. It
particularly reinforces the strength of the majority party in the Senate. If that party is targeting the expression of support for particular
policies or ideologies, then nominees who can be shown to have made
such expressions face potentially serious obstacles to their confirmation from the outset.
The blue-slip process for particular nominations can thus be
shown in at least two ways. First, it can simply be shown as the
number of times it has been invoked to block nominations. This
number reflects its vitality at a given moment in the confirmation
process. Alternatively, and perhaps more meaningfully, an empiricist
can measure what, if any, characteristics nominations blocked
through the blue-slip process had in common. The number of nominations with supposed ideological commitments that triggered senatorial concern can then be calculated. It will be a fraction of the total
number blocked through the blue-slip process.
7. Numbers of Witnesses
The numbers of witnesses called for and against nominees are
likely to be pertinent to their chances of success in the confirmation
process. The number of people testifying, particularly against a
nominee, is likely to signal some problem with the nomination. If
more people are testifying against a nominee than for him or her, the
nomination is almost certainly in trouble. Of course, these numbers
alone do not indicate the reasons for support or opposition. Some
people may be opposed because of the nominee’s supposed ideological
commitments, but one must go behind these numbers in order to determine this information.
8. The American Bar Association
The American Bar Association’s ratings on nominees may affect
the fates of nominations. Positive ratings do not guarantee confirmation, but negative or largely unfavorable ratings are bound to considerably lower a nominee’s chances for confirmation. Even split ratings
can be a problem (though not always fatal). The American Bar Association comes as close as any group to providing a “neutral” assessment of a nominee’s qualifications, and its ratings may be used by either side in a confirmation contest depending on the extent to which
they are favorable or unfavorable. Thus, its assessment needs to be
factored into any analysis of the process.

2005]

SELECTION BY THE NUMBERS

1233

9. Integrity
Nominees ought to get an integrity rating. We expect judicial
nominees to be honest people, whose integrity is beyond reproach.
More than a few judicial nominations have failed because of nominees’ ethical lapses. One problem (of many) torpedoing Clement
Haynsworth’s nomination to the Supreme Court was his participation in some cases involving companies in which his wife had owned
stock.82 Less than two decades later, Douglas Ginsburg asked President Reagan to withdraw his nomination as an Associate Justice because he had failed to inform the FBI during background checks that
he had smoked marijuana while he was a tenured Harvard Law
School professor.83
10. Merit
Of course, merit is a factor that cannot be ignored in evaluating
the judicial selection process. The absence of merit, or questions
about nominees’ qualifications, can be fatal to judicial (and of course
many other) nominations. Even though we lack consensus on merit,
it would be silly to dismiss it as irrelevant to the outcome of confirmation proceedings. In an empirical analysis of the selection process,
we must, at the very least, measure the extent to which witnesses before the Judiciary Committee and members of the Committee focus
on merit in their statements or questions. Presumably, the more it
expressly comes up in hearings, the more potential impact it may
have on a nomination’s fate. Of course, merit might be a red herring
or a pretext. It is thus very important to give special attention to
what those who come closest to being neutral observers or less-selfinterested parties have said about the merits of particular nominations. So we might give special weight to evaluations by the American Bar Association, or perhaps to leading scholars, on the merits of
particular nominations.
Because so many people (particularly Republicans) have questioned the neutrality of the American Bar Association and of law professors generally, one might have to look elsewhere for neutral or
less-self-interested evaluators of merit. These are just nine factors,
besides ideology, that are likely to affect the fates of judicial nominations. The odds are that judicial nominations will not founder simply
because of one of these factors. Moreover, it is possible, if not likely,
that the stated grounds of opposition to judicial nominations might
not be entirely credible; they might reflect, at least to some extent, a
pretext to oppose a nomination. For instance, the Judiciary Commit82. YALOF, supra note 72, at 104-08.
83. BRONNER, supra note 37, at 332-35.
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tee never acted on President Clinton’s nomination of Elena Kagan to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 2000. She
never got a hearing, much less a vote, on her nomination, in spite of
her strong credentials. No one expressed opposition to her because of
her ideology. Instead, opposition, to the extent it was ever manifest
in public, focused more on whether the appellate court to which she
had been nominated had a caseload to justify filling all of the seats to
which the President had nominated people.84 Some people might view
this opposition as merely a pretext to preclude the confirmation of
someone whom the opposition party feared might be a liberal activist
or who would then occupy a seat that it would have preferred for one
of its own to occupy. After President Bush took office, Republican
leaders acknowledged the court’s caseload justified filling all of its
seats after all.85 And President Bush then nominated Miguel Estrada
to one of them. It is possible that at least some opposition to the Estrada nomination derived in part from a desire for payback, though
the grounds cited related to Estrada’s temperament and possible judicial ideology. While payback is another possible factor that needs to
be monitored in the confirmation process, it is hard to verify, because
Senators rarely (but sometimes do) acknowledge that it is the basis
for their opposition.
In the final analysis, proving that ideology significantly affects the
fates of nominations is not easy. Proving it may be so difficult that
many people simply opt for anecdotal evidence or opt for merely analyzing the appeal of a particular nominee’s ideology. After all, it is
not necessary to prove that all nominees shared commitments to
problematic ideologies, but rather only the ones that Senators end up
choosing to oppose for stated or unstated reasons. The higher, or
more powerful, the court to which someone has been nominated, the
more likely Senators will be concerned about the person’s likely judicial ideology. It is thus likely that Senators will be more concerned
with the likely ideologies of circuit court or Supreme Court nominees
than district court nominees. In any event, as long as Senators do not
fear the President, Senators remain relatively free to pick and choose
which nominees to oppose and on what bases.
V. CONCLUSION
I close with a challenge. I challenge others to talk more openly
about merit in judicial selection and particularly whether merit can
be defined separately from ideology. If so, then we have to wonder
84. Amy Goldstein & Neely Tucker, Bush Plans to Add 2 Judges to Key Court, WASH.
POST, Dec. 15, 2002, at A1; see also Jenna Russell, Harvard Picks First Female Dean of
Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 2003, at B3.
85. See Goldstein & Tucker, supra note 84.
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why more scholars, Presidents, and Senators do not do so. If not,
then we need to explain why our apparent failure to separate merit
from ideology ought not to lead us to simply join forces with the social scientists who believe that judges are nothing more than policymakers who just happen to wear robes.

